Abstract. This paper analyzes the impact of investment in information technology (IT) on the recent resurgence of world economic growth. We describe the growth of the world economy, seven regions, and 14 major economies during the period 1989-2004. We allocate the growth of world output between input growth and productivity and find, surprisingly, that input growth greatly predominates! Moreover, differences in per capita output levels are explained by differences in per capita input, rather than variations in productivity. The contributions of IT investment have increased in all regions, but especially in industrialized economies and Developing Asia.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of investment in information technology (IT) equipment and software on the recent revival of world economic growth. The crucial role of IT investment in the growth of the US economy has been thoroughly documented and widely discussed.
1 Jorgenson (2001) has shown that the remarkable behavior of IT prices is the key to understanding of the American growth resurgence since 1995. This behavior can be traced to developments in semiconductor technology that are widely understood by technologists and economists. Jorgenson (2003) has shown that the growth of IT investment jumped to double-digit levels after 1995 in all the G7 economies -Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom, as well as the United States. 2 These economies account for nearly half of world output and a much larger share of world IT investment. The surge of IT investment resulted from a sharp acceleration in the rate of decline of prices of IT equipment and software. Jorgenson (2001) has traced this to a drastic shortening of the product cycle for semiconductors from three to two years, beginning in 1995.
In Section 2, we describe the growth of the world economy, seven economic regions, and 14 major economies during the period 1989-2004. 3 The world economy is divided among the G7 and Non-G7 industrialized economies, Developing Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, North Africa and the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The 14 major economies include the G7 economies listed above and the developing and transition economies of Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and South Korea.
We have subdivided the period 1989-2004 into 1989-95, 1995-2000 and 2000-04 in order to focus on the response of IT investment to the accelerated decline in IT prices in 1995 and the impact of the dot-com crash of 2000. World economic growth has undergone a powerful revival since 1995. The per capita growth rate jumped a full percentage point from 2.72 per cent during 1989-95 to 3.73 per cent in 1995-2000 and higher growth was sustained at a rate of 3.75 per cent after 2000. We can underscore the significance of more rapid growth by pointing out that per capita growth of 2.72 per cent doubles world output by four times in a century, while 3.75 per cent doubles output more than five times per century.
In Section 3, we allocate the growth of world output between input growth and productivity. Our most astonishing finding is that input growth greatly predominates! Productivity growth accounted for less than one-fifth of the total during 1989-95, while input growth accounted for more than fourfifths. Similarly, input growth contributed almost three-quarters of growth from 1995 to 2000 and more than three-fifths from 2000 to 2004. The only departure from this worldwide trend was the revival of economic growth in Eastern Europe after 1995, driven by a rebound from the productivity collapse of 1989-95. In Section 3, we distribute the growth of input per capita between investments in human capital and tangible assets, especially IT equipment and software. The world economy, all seven regions, and the 14 major economies experienced a surge in investment in IT after 1995. The soaring level of US IT investment after 1995 was paralleled by jumps in IT investment throughout the industrialized world. The contributions of IT investment in Developing Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, North Africa and the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa more than doubled after 1995, beginning from much lower levels.
The contribution of IT investment to growth of the G7 economies has moderated substantially since the dot-com crash of 2000. The IT contribution has slowed for the Non-G7 industrialized economies as well. However, the contribution of IT investment has continued to rise for Developing Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, North Africa and the Middle East, and SubSaharan Africa. The contributions of Non-IT investment and labor input to world growth declined after the dot-com crash, but total factor productivity growth rose substantially, reflecting increases in all regions except North Africa and the Middle East.
In Section 4, we present levels of output per capita, input per capita and productivity for the world economy, the seven economic regions, and the 14 major economies. We find that differences in per capita output levels are primarily explained by differences in per capita input, rather than variations in productivity. Taking US output per capita in 2000 as 100.0, world output per capita was a relatively modest 24.9 in 2004. Using similar scales for input and productivity, world input per capita in 2004 was a substantial 37.7 and world productivity a robust 66.0. Section 5 concludes the paper.
WORLD ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1989-2004
In order to set the stage for analyzing the impact of IT investment on the growth of the world economy, we first consider the shares of world product and growth for the seven regions and 14 major economies presented in Table 1 . Following Jorgenson (2001) , we have chosen GDP as a measure of output. We employ the Penn World Table, presented by Heston (2002) , as the primary data source on GDP and purchasing power parities for economies outside the G7 and the European Union before enlargement in May 2004. 4 We have revised and updated the United States data presented by Jorgenson (2001) Baldwin and Harchaoui (2003) . Data for France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, and the economies of the European Union before enlargement have been developed for the European Commission by Timmer et al. (2003 Timmer et al. ( , updated 2005 . Finally, data for Japan have been assembled by Jorgenson and Motohashi for the Research Institute on Economy, Trade and Industry; see Jorgenson and Motohashi (2005) . We During 1989-95 the United States accounted for 22.9 per cent of world product and 46.6 per cent of G7 product. The US share of G7 output rose to 47.9 per cent from 1995 to 2000 and 49.6 per cent during 2000-04. After 1995 Japan fell from its ranking as the world's second largest economy to third largest after China, but remained second among the G7 economies. Germany dropped from fourth place before 1995, following the United States, China and Japan, to fifth place after 1995, ranking behind India as well. However, Germany retained its position as the leading European economy. France, Italy and the United Kingdom were considerably smaller, but similar in size. Canada was the smallest of the G7 economies.
The US growth rate jumped from 2. 
SOURCES OF WORLD ECONOMIC GROWTH
In this section, we allocate the sources of world economic growth among the contributions of capital and labor inputs and the growth of productivity. About 35-40 per cent of world growth can be attributed to the accumulation and deployment of capital and another a quarter to a third to the more effective use of labor. We find that productivity, frequently described as the primary engine of economic growth, accounted for only 20-40 per cent of growth.
We have derived estimates of capital input and property income from national accounting data for the G7 economies. We have constructed estimates of hours worked and labor compensation from labor force surveys for each of these economies. We measure the contribution of labor inputs, classified by age, sex, educational attainment and employment status, by weighting the growth rate of each type of labor input by its share in the value of output. Finally, we employ purchasing power parities for capital and labor inputs constructed by Jorgenson (2003) . 6 We have extended these estimates of capital and labor inputs to the 103 Non-G7 countries using data sources and methods described in the Appendix to the electronic version of the paper. Our second objective is to explore the determinants of the growth of capital input, emphasizing the role of investment in information technology equipment and software. We have derived estimates of IT investment from national accounting data for the G7 and the economies of the European Union before enlargement. We measure the contribution of IT investment to economic growth by weighting the growth rate of IT capital input by its share in the value of output. Similarly, the contribution of Non-IT investment is a share-weighted growth rate of Non-IT capital input. The contribution of capital input is the sum of these two components.
We have revised and updated the US data presented by Jorgenson (2001) on investment in information technology and equipment.
8 Data on IT investment for Canada have been constructed by Statistics Canada; see Baldwin and Harchaoui (2003) . Data for the countries of the European Union have been developed for the European Commission by Timmer et al. (2003 Timmer et al. ( , updated 2005 . Finally, data for Japan have been assembled by Jorgenson and Motohashi (2005) . We have relied on the WITSA Digital Planet Report (2006), as the starting point for estimates of IT investment for the remaining economies.
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Our third objective is to analyze the determinants of the growth of labor input, focusing on the role of investment in human capital. We have divided labor input growth between the growth of hours worked and labor quality, where quality is defined as the ratio of labor input to hours worked. Labor quality growth captures the impact of changes in the composition of labor 6. Purchasing power parities for inputs follow the methodology described in detail by Jorgenson and Yip (2001) . 7. We employ data on educational attainment from Barro et al. (2001) input. These arise, e.g., through increases in the education and experience of the labor force. The contribution of labor input is the sum of the two components, weighted by the share of labor in output. Finally, productivity growth is the difference between the rate of growth of output and the contributions of capital and labor inputs. The contribution of capital input to world economic growth before 1995 was 1.13 per cent, more than 41.5 per cent of the growth rate of 2.72 per cent. Labor input contributed 1 per cent or slightly o36.4 per cent of growth, while productivity growth was 0. The first half of the 1990s was a continuation of the Asian Miracle, analyzed by Paul Krugman (1994) , Lawrence Lau (1999) and Young (1995) . This period was dominated by the spectacular rise of China and India and the continuing emergence of the Gang of Four -Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. However, all Asian economies, except the Philippines, had growth rates in excess of the world average of 2.72 per cent. The second half of the 1990s was dominated by the Asian financial crisis but, surprisingly, conforms much more closely to the 'Krugman thesis' attributing Asian growth to input growth rather than productivity. The 'Krugman thesis' was originally propounded to distinguish the Asian Miracle from growth in industrialized countries. According to this thesis, Asian growth was differentiated by high growth rates and a great predominance of inputs over productivity as the sources of growth. In fact, the peak of productivity growth in Developing Asia, absolutely and relatively, was during the Asian Miracle of the early 1990s! Moreover, growth in the world economy and the G7 economies was dominated by growth of capital and labor inputs, not productivity.
Developing Asia experienced a steady increase in the contribution of investment in IT equipment and software to economic growth. The contribution of IT investment more than doubled from 0. 
WORLD OUTPUT, INPUT AND PRODUCTIVITY
The final step in analyzing the world growth resurgence is to characterize the evolution of levels of output, input and productivity for the world economy, the seven economic regions and the 14 major economies. In Table 3 , we present levels of output per capita when the transition from socialism began in 1989, at the start of the worldwide IT investment boom in 1995, at the beginning of the dot-com crash in 2000, and at the end of the period covered by our study in 2004. We also present input per capita and productivity for these years, where productivity is defined as the ratio of output to input.
Differences in per capita output levels are mainly due to differences in per capita input, rather than disparities in productivity. Taking US output per capita in 2000 as 100.0, world output per capita was a relatively modest 18.6 in 1989. Using similar scales for input and productivity, world input per It is not surprising that world productivity is much closer to US levels than world input per capita. As globalization has proceeded, technologies have been transferred with relative ease from industrialized economies to the developing world. Mobilization of inputs in developing economies has been remarkable, but has required far more time and effort. Institutional barriers to accumulation of human and non-human capital must be overcome and networks among the cooperating activities must be established and enhanced. Obsolete methods for organizing production must be displaced by up-to-date techniques that employ information technology equipment and software.
The output gap between the United States and the other G7 economies has widened since the American growth resurgence began in 1995. The G7 economies led the seven economic regions in output per capita, input per capita and productivity throughout the period 1989-2004. Output per capita in the G7 was, nonetheless, well below US levels. Taking US output per capita in 2000 as 100.0, G7 output per capita was 67.2 in 1989, 73.3 in 1995, 83. For the Latin American region output per capita rose from 19.4 to 22.6 during 1989-2004, input per capita rose from 28.2 to 32.7, but productivity was essentially unchanged throughout the period at about two-thirds of the US level in 2000. The stall in productivity from 1989 to 2004 was pervasive, contrasting sharply with the rise in productivity in the G7 economies, the Non-G7 industrialized economies, and Developing Asia. Nonetheless, Latin America's lagging output per capita was due chiefly to insufficient input per capita, rather than a shortfall in productivity.
Brazil's economic performance has been anemic at best and has acted as a drag on the growth of Latin America and the world economy. Despite productivity levels comparable to the rest of Latin America, Brazil was unable to generate substantial growth in input per capita. Mexico lost ground in productivity between 1989 and 2004, but made steady gains in input per capita and expanded output per capita substantially after 1995.
Output and input per capita in Sub-Saharan Africa was the lowest in the world throughout the period 1989-2004, but the level of productivity was slightly higher than that of Developing Asia until 2000. All the economies of North Africa and the Middle East fell short of world average levels of output and input per capita. Output per capita grew slowly but steadily for the region as a whole during 1989-2004, powered by impressive gains in input per capita and productivity.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
World economic growth, led by the industrialized economies and Developing Asia, experienced a strong resurgence after 1995. Developing Asia accounted for almost half of world economic growth during 1989-2004 but remained well below the world average in output per capita. Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa and the Middle East also languished below the world average. Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union lost enormous ground during the transition from socialism and have yet to recover completely.
Growth trends apparent in the United States have counterparts throughout the world. Investment in tangible assets, including IT equipment and software, was the most important source of growth. However, Non-IT investment predominated. The contribution of labor input was next in magnitude with hours worked outweighing labor quality. Finally, productivity was the dominant source of growth only in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union during the recovery from the output and productivity collapse of 1989-95 that accompanied the beginning of the transition from socialism to a market economy.
The leading role of IT investment in the acceleration of growth in the G7 economies is especially pronounced in the United States The contribution of labor input predominated in the Non-G7 industrialized economies, as well as Latin America, Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and North Africa and the Middle East. Productivity growth was an important source of growth in Developing Asia during the Asian Miracle before 1995, but growth of capital and labor inputs rose in importance after 1995, contrary to the 'Krugman thesis'. Productivity has been stagnant or declining in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and North Africa and the Middle East.
All seven regions of the world economy experienced a surge in investment in IT equipment and software after 1995. The impact of IT investment on economic growth was most striking in the G7 economies. The rush in IT investment was especially conspicuous in the United States, but jumps in the contribution of IT capital input in Canada, Japan and the United Kingdom were only slightly lower. France, Germany and Italy also experienced a surge in IT investment, but lagged considerably behind the leaders. IT investment subsided among the G7 economies after the dot-com crash of 2000, while the contribution of Non-IT investment varied considerably and explains important differences among growth rates of the G7 economies.
The surge in investment in IT equipment and software is a global phenomenon, but the variation in the contribution of this investment has grown considerably since 1995. The moderation in IT investment in the industrialized countries after the dot-com crash of 2000 was accompanied by continued expansion in the contribution of IT in the developing world, especially in Asia. The contribution of IT investment more than doubled after 1995 in Developing Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and North Africa and the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Finally, despite spectacular growth rates in Developing Asia, levels of output per capita remain below world averages. Differences in per capita output levels are mainly due to input per capita rather than productivity. This reflects the fact that technology is relatively easy to transfer from industrialized economies to developing economies, while mobilization of capital and labor inputs requires much more time and considerably greater effort. Outmoded techniques of production must give way to newer methods that incorporate the latest technologies, especially those that utilize information technology equipment and software.
